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The stabilization of international commodity prices as a means of
combating depressions has attracted the interest of many able
•economists and has obtained the support of several well-known and
highly respected ones. Keynes and the two Grahams are examples.
More recently, the stabilization of international prices has been in-
vestigated as a means of preventing the spread of deflation from
the presumably unstable economy of the United States to the other
trading countries. The proposal is of interest to important groups in
the United States, particularly agricultural producers, since many
important export products of this country would be included in
any such program.
This paper is restricted to a discussion of price stability of primary
products—foodstuffs, other agricultural products, and minerals.
Even within this group there is a considerable diversity of condi-
tions of demand and supply. However, we can say that the typical
primary product has an extremely low price elasticity of demand,
a low short- and intermediate-run price elasticity of supply, and a
low income elasticity of demand. The first characteristic is probably
the most nearly universal of the three and obtains for one of two
reasons: either because the primary product is a food and is sub-
ject to the generally low price elasticity of demand characteristic
of foods, or because it is a raw material constituting only a small
part of the total input in any final product and, in the short run at
least, used in approximately fixed amounts per unit of output.
The low priqe elasticity of supply is more apparent for agricul-
tural products than for mineral products. Most agricultural products
are produced by independent proprietors who face highly inelastic
supply functions for factors, while increasingly the production of
minerals is undertaken by large firms or combines that can adapt
their output to shifts in aggregate demand.
The low income elasticity of demand is a less widespread char-
acteristic—iron ore, for example, has a relatively high income elas-
ticity as do most minerals, rubber, and some textiles. Foodstuffs have
low income elasticities. At first glance it might appear that a low in-
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come elasticity of demand would be favorable to price stability in
that variations in real income would have little influence upon the
level of demand for the product. And this would be true if either the
price elasticity of supply or that of demand, or both, were relatively
high. But if these two elasticities are low, large variations in prices
during a business cycle are not
Effect of Price Elasticities on Price Stability
The low price elasticities of supply and demand are important in
contributing to price instability because in this setting speculative
activity may increase price instability at certain times, though not
universally. This is not meant to constitute a condemnation of
speculative activity—it does little good to condemn an activity that
cannot be eliminated. Any commodity that has some degree of dura-
bility ("relatively low" cost of storage per unit of time) must be held
by someone. Decisions must be made concerning the quantity of
stocks and their location—it is these decisions that constitute specu-
lative activity.
When price elasticities are low, signals that prices are "too high"
1Theprice behavior of primary products in response to changes in income can
be readily indicated. If we assume constant price and income elasticities, with
income having no effect on the quantity supplied, we have:
(1)
(2)
Equation 1 is the demand function. If we wish to determine the effect of changes
in income on changes in price, we have p p =
(+ a).Theelasticity of price with respect to income is +a).Thusif
the price and income elasticities are .1, the elasticity of price with respect to in-
come is .5. If the elasticity of supply ('i)werezero in the short run, the elasticity
of price with respect to income would be unity, i.e. the decline in price would
be the same as the decline in income. If all three elasticities are unity, it is
apparent that the elasticity of price with respect to income is .5. The influence
of high elasticities of supply is immediately apparent. Assume income and price
elasticities of demand equal to unity, but a price elasticity of suppiy equal to 5
(which is probably an underestimate for such industries as automobiles and
steel for downward price adjustments); the elasticity of price with respect to
income would be only
Whilea large price elasticity of supply will give considerable stability to price,
it does not necessarily stabilize gross income unless the income elasticity of de-
mand is very low (appreciably less than unity). The following cases may be used
for illustrative purposes, assuming a decline in income of 40 per cent; (1) Gross
income fall by 22 per cent if price and income elasticities of demand were
.1 and the supply elasticity were .1; if the supply elasticity were 5.0, the decline
in gross income would be 4.7 per cent. (2) If the price and income elasticities of
demand were both unity, gross income would fall by 40 per cent for any value of
the elasticityof supply.
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or "too low" are very slow in making their appearance. If certain
expectations about prices during a specified period (say, the year
following the coffee harvest) have resulted in current prices that
will restrict consumption during the period and create larger stocks
at the end of the year than firms would be willing to hold at current
prices, then an attempt will be made to reduce inventory holdings
and prices may fall below the level prevailing at the beginning of
the period.2 The low price elasticity makes this type of price be-
havior possible since it may take several months for the small re-
duction in consumption to reveal itself in terms of increased inven-
tories, especially since the data on inventories are always subject to
error. If the price elasticity of demand were relatively high (say 1.0
or more), it would soon become apparent that consumption was
occurring at too low a rate and price adjustments could occur rather
promptly.
It should be noted that price stability for internationally traded
products will not entirely insulate the level of income and employ-
ment in other countries from the effect of recession or depression
in one country. As the examples in footnote 1 indicate, a decline in
2Letme illustrate by a hypothetical example: Assume a constant price elasticity
of demand of .2 for a product at the final demand level for final use (thus ex-
cluding the demand for inventories). Total supply is 1.2 billion units for the time
period. Normal working stocks (the amount held when there is no expectation of
a price change during the period) are 200 million units. Something occurs that
indicates demand will increase and decisions are made to increase stocks to 300
million units, thus cutting consumption by 10 per cent and increasing the price
by 50 per cent. If the price rises by 50 per cent, it is not unreasonable that in-
ventory holders will revise their expectations and attempt to increase inventories
to 400 million units, thus resulting in a price approximately double the price at
the beginning of the period. Assume that demand at the final consumer level has,
in fact, not increased. Because of the relatively small effect on the rate of con-
sumption, it may take one-half the time period before inventory holders realize
that demand has not increased. Thus with no price change total stocks (assuming
equal consumption per unit of time) would have been 700 million units at the
end of one-half of the time period. With the price having doubled, stocks will be
800 million, or even less if the price rise occurred fairly evenly during the first
half. If this is taken as a signal by inventory holders that final demand has not
increased and an attempt is made to reduce inventories to the normal level of 200
million units, consumption will have to increase by at least 10 per cent over the
rate that would have prevailed during the second half had prices remained
stable during the entire period. Thus price movements during the period may be
from 100 to 200 and then down to 50 by the end of the period. It is possible
that as the price falls below 100, inventory holders will be willing to hold more
than 200 million units as working stocks since it may be assumed that the price
will return to 100 in the next period, but there is no certainty that such decisions
will be made before the price falls to 50. During such a decline in price, some
inventory holders will be forced to liquidate holdings because of capital impair-
ments; others who gained liquid assets during the price rise may not purchase for
inventories until they believe the price decline has been halted.
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demand can have as much effect on the gross income from a product
whose price is stabilized by an elastic supply function as on that
from a product with highly inelastic supply and demand functions
and a low income elasticity. If the income elasticity of demand is
fairly high and the decline in real income large, gross income from
the commodity with a stable price (highly elastic supply function)
will fall sharply. Farmers' expenditures for farm machinery between
1929 and 1932 are an example of this latter type of shift. The out-
put of farm products was unchanged, prices declined by 56 .per
cent, and cash receipts declined by 58 per cent. Farm machinery
prices declined, by 9 per cent; farmers' expenditures for farm ma-
chinery by 80 per cent. The effect of the 1937—1938 depression on
the value of imports is another example. The unit value of jute im-
ports declined by 1 per cent, the quantity of imports by 62 per cent,
and the total value of imports by 63 per cent. On the other hand, the
unit value of coconut oil decreased by 47 per cent, the value of im-
ports decreased by 43 per cent, and the quantity of imports in-
creased by 8 per cent.
While agreement on specific methods may be difficult, it is not
impossible to stabilize the prices of a number of internationally
traded products. In fact, if a commodity has 'a low income elasticity,
low price elasticities of supply and demand, and relatively low
costs of storage, such stabilization may not be 'difficult. Several ex-
amples may be given. Since 1948 the, United States has gone a con-
siderable distance in stabilizing the prices of cotton and tobacco,
and the United States and Canada together have effectively stabi-
lized wheat prices. Through various forms of internal controls and
long-term contracts with the United Kingdom, New Zealand and
Denmark have stabilized for the past six years the price of butter
moving in international trade.
But in stabilizing prices within a fairly narrow range, the United
States and Canada have not been able to stabilize export earnings.
Between 1952 and 1953 the value of cotton exports declined by al-
most two-fifths though unit export value declined only a sixth, while
United States wheat export revenues also declined by two-fifths and
unit export value decreased about 7 per cent. But it should be noted
that in the United States, and to a considerable degree in Canada,
the gross returns received by producers were not affected to any sig-
nificant extent by the decline in export returns. As a result,' the pur-
chasing power—or level of expenditures of farmers—was maintained
despite the drop in export earnings.
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Price Stabilization Measures
The methods that might be used to stabilize the prices of primary
products that move in international trade may be classified into
three general categories:
1. Control of the amount moving in international trade by the use
of import and export quotas, buttressed when necessary by out-
put restrictions in the major producing countries
2. The establishment of sufficient stocks of each individual com-
modity to permit moderating price changes of each product
8. The establishment of a joint buffer stock operation for many
commodities with the objective of stabilizing the average prices
of a number of commodities, but not the price of any individual
commodity
The second and third methods are related in that both rely upon
variations in stocks rather than upon direct control of the amounts
traded or produced. But they differ in terms of objectives and prob-
ably in terms of the appropriate institutional arrangements.
Past experience indicates that the first method has usually failed.
The only important exception is the United States tobacco program
in which a remarkable degree of price stabilization has been
achieved by unilateral limitation of output supplemented by a
storage program. With the increasing output of tobacco in other
parts of the world, especially in Africa, success may bring its own
undoing within the next decade. Multilateral arrangements—com-
modity agreements—have not had any noticeable degree of success.
The 1949 International Wheat Agreement's moderate success was
due more to the United States and Canadian storage program than
to the Agreement itself. The difficulties of maintaining such agree-
ments are well illustrated by the failure of the United States and the
United Kingdom to reach agreement on the appropriate price range
at the time of renewal.
It is. reasonable, I believe, to argue that no price stabilization
scheme can function without provision for the possible accumula-
tion of relatively large stocks, and, perhaps more important, for a
control of such stocks strong enough to prevent their untimely
liquidation. The experience of the Federal Farm Board was evi-
dence of the importance of stock control, while various interna-
I will not discuss a fourth type of arrangement in which an exporter agrees to
a price that is too low—a price at which there is excess demand. I suspect that
some of the success of Denmark and New Zealand in stabilizing the price of butter
since 1948 has been due to this kind of pricing.
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tional commodity agreements failed largely because they did not
provide adequate stock provisions.
It should also be noted that price stabilization achieved by con-
trol of the quantities moving in international trade does not achieve
stability in the value of trade. Thus even if the first method could
be operated successfully in• stabilizing prices by controlling the
amount traded and the amount produced, its countercyclical fea-
tures would be relatively unimportant for the products with rela-
tively high income elasticities. However, it must be noted that buf-
fer stock operations increase in difficulty as the income elasticities
of demand approach and exceed unity.
Commodity Reserves
Joint buffer stock operations that involve stabilizing the aver-
age price of a group of commodities and not the price of any one
have impressive support.4 These proposals usually take one of two
forms—the use of the commodity reserves as a monetary base or as
a separate operation with no direct link to national currencies.
The use of the commodity reserves as a monetary standard, in
the same sense that gold has been used, seems to me to be beset
with many and important difficulties with few offsetting advantages.
Friedman's conclusion that a commodity reserve currency has most
of the disadvantages of a gold standard while lacking its emotional
appeal is difficult to refute. Compared with a fiat standard, the com-
modity reserve is much more expensive and would probably be no
less subject to political Many requirements must be
met before the commodity reserve scheme could operate as a true
international standard. For example, there would have to be free
trade in the commodities in the unit and the nations would have
to accommodate their monetary and fiscal policies to the require-
ments imposed by stable exchange rates. Thus if a country were los-
ing reserves of the commodity unit, it would have to permit a con-
traction of its money supply and perhaps follow a deflationary fiscal
policy.
But there would be, in my opinion, no need to operate the corn-
m9dity reserve as a monetary unit. Such a reserve could be oper-
ated either by an international agency or by the cooperation of a
For a partial bibliography of such proposals see Commodity Trade and Eco-
nomic Development, United Nations (E/2519), 1953, p. 35, and for a general
discussion see ibid., pp. 35—36 and 55—66.
Milton Friedman, "Commodity-Reserve Currency," Journal of Political Econ-
omy, June 1951, pp. 230—232.
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number of individual governments. The value of the unit could be
expressed in terms of any one currency or any of a group of cur-
rencies freely convertible one to the other. The major political dif-
ficulty would be that of getting sufficient financial support to pre-
vent the venture from collapsing at an unpropitious moment. How
large the financial resources would have to be would depend upon
the number of commodities included in the unit, the nature of their
demand and supply functions, and the extent of changes in demand
during the course of a business cycle.
But leaving the problem of finance aside, how satisfactorily would
such aproposaloperate? One of the first requirements for suc-
cessful operation would be a self-imposed restraining ordinance by
all or most members of the trading world to limit or eliminate their
own price support operations. It would also be highly desirable if
importing countries either allowed free trade in the commodities in
the unit or maintained a constant degree of protection during the
business cycle. If a country—say, the United States—had sufficiently
large stocks of a commodity included in the unit, purchases of that
commodity would have little or no effect on its price and if made
from United States stocks would have no expansionary effects on
demand. Thus price variations that would occur within the unit
would be concentrated upon commodities without domestic price
support programs.
If a large number of commodities were included in the unit, the
degree of price instability for any one commodity would be rela-
tively large. Price variability due to individual demand and output
variability would not be eliminated. For example, the recent rise
in coffee prices could not have been prevented if the commodity
reserve had been in operation-_nor could the subsequent fall.
But what of price variability related to the cycle? How would
different commodities fare if the only source of variability were
cyclical variability in demand? Three examples may help answer
these questions.
In the first, it is assumed that there are only two commodities,
A and B, and that they have equal importance in the commodity
unit. Commodity A has a price elasticity of demand and of supply
and an income elasticity equal to .1, while B has elasticities equal to
1.0.6Realper capita incomes fall by 80 per cent and it is desired to
6Thestatements concerning price and income elasticities are only approxi-
mately accurate. For ease of calculation, linear relationships were used and the
elasticities relate to the prices, quantities, and incomes that prevailed prior to the
decline in income.
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hold the value of the unit at 100. The prices of both A and B equaled
100 before the drop in real income. Under these assumptions the
price of A would rise to 112.5 and that of B would fall to 87.5.
Without the commodity reserve, the prices of both commodities
would have fallen to 85; thus almost all of the direct gain would
have gone to the producers of commodity A.
In the second example, the characteristics of commodity A re-
main the same, but the supply elasticity for commodity B now is
the same as for A (other characteristics as before). In this exam-
ple, if the value of the unit were maintained at 100 by purchases,
the price of A would be 120 and the price of B, 80. Without the
program, the price of B would be about 78.
In our third example, all elasticities remain the same as in the
second except that the price elasticity of demand for B is now
changed to .5. After the decline in demand, the price of A would be
about 134 and the price of B about 65 (instead of 50 without the
program).
The above examples are not unrealistic, and I believe that groups
of commodities can be found that have the characteristics of A
(wheat, rye, tobacco) and the characteristics of B (the third variant
is more likely than the first two because it is doubtful if any raw
materials have a short-run price elasticity as high as unity). Com-
modities with the characteristics of B (third variant) might include.
rubber, jute, and perhaps cotton and wool. The first variant of B
might include copper and tin, since the price elasticity can be re-
duced to .5 without having much effect on the results. These pre-
sumptions are admittedly made on the basis of inadequate evidence
—more especially, inadequate analysis on the available data. But the
absolute values of the elasticities are less important than the value of
one commodity relative to that of another. If the income elasticities
differ from commodity to commodity, their relative prices will be
affected by additions to or deletions from the reserve.
Let us extend this exercise, using the third example as a base.
Assume that, during recovery from a depression, an inflation oc-
curs in the trading world. For a period of time, commodity units
are sold at the same rate per unit of time as they were accumulated.
(Real income returns to the pre-depression level, but other costs
lag enough so that the average price of the unit can remain at 100
only if sales are made from the reserve.) The price of A would fall
to 75, while the price of B would increase to 125. As the inflation is
checked and other costs rise to reduce the demand for A and B or
as the price of the unit is increased to prevent further sales, the
relative prices of A and B would return to unity.
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If these examples are not extreme, it is possible that the opera-
tions of the commodity reserve would introduce fairly significant
variations in the prices of the commodities included in the unit.
More price variability would probably occur without such a pro-
gram, given a specified decline in real income. However, I can give
examples which would contradict this statement.
So far as I know, none of those interested in commodity reserve
proposals have discussed the problems that would arise because of
differences in income elasticities and, to a lesser degree, in price
elasticities of supply and demand. Such differences might present
international political problems of a serious character. The major
producers of many commodities similar to A are the rich countries
of the world—the United States, Canada, and Australia—while some
of the commodities falling in the B group come from poor areas.
There is a solution to the difficulties discussed above: each com-
modity in the unit might be appropriately weighted. The relative
weights would have to be based upon the income elasticities of
demand, but this requirement does not preclude taking into ac-
count the relative importance of the commodities in world trade
or in total production. However, we may assume for the moment
that all commodities would be given equal quantitative weight in
the commodity reserve unit. It would then be necessary to make
the weights proportional to the income elasticities of demand. Thus,
if the income elasticity of demand for A were 1.0, for B, .5, and for
C, .1, the reserve unit would consist of 10 units of A, 5 units of B,
and only 1 unit of C. During a deflation the greater purchases of A
and B relative to C would act to stabilize the prices of A, B, and C
separately as well as in combination (if the supply functions did
not contain a random element).
This solution has some major drawbacks: estimates of income
elasticities may be unreliable; relative income elasticities may not
be stable throughout the cycle; income elasticities prevailing in any
one business cycle may be affected by the primary source of the
decline or expansion of demand. In any case, it may be argued
that, once one has modified the reserve unit in the required direc-
tion, there is much to be gained by purchasing commodities as a
unit instead of separately.
Buffer Stocks for Individual Commodities
The establishment of separate buffer stock programs for each
commodity (or for a group of commodities with similar income
elasticities of demand) would eliminate the problem of the corn-
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modity reserve unit discussed above. But, even if several •such
programs were operated by a single international agency, there
would be a problem of choosing the appropriate price range for in-
dividual commodity buffer stocks. How rapidly stocks can ac-
cumulate if the price is set somewhat too high can be seen from
United States experience in butter, cotton, and wheat during 1951—
1952 and 1952—1953. It is also evident that seemingly large stocks
of an individual commodity can disappear very rapidly. Because
the Department of Agriculture expected large stocks of cotton to be
in existence by the fall of 1950, steps were taken in late 1949 to im-
pose acreage limitations on cotton. Because of a small United States
crop (due mainly to bad weather) combined with the expanded
demand after June 1950, United States stocks declined from 6.8
million bales in August 1950 to 2.2 million in August 1951, even
though the government imposed restrictive exportquotas.It may be
noted that the world supply of cotton for 1950—1951 was only 3
per cent smaller than for 1949—1950, the price of Brazilian cotton
increased by 125 per cent in the nine months following June 1950,
and the price of United States cotton (even with the export quota)
increased 55 per cent in a year. The reduction in United States
stocks was about 14 per cent of an average world crop of cotton,
and the actual cotton used increased by 12.5 per cent between
1949—1950 and 1950—1951.
While it is true that individual buffer stock schemes would not
tend to increase the prices of commodities with low income elastici-
ties during a period of decline in demand, it is not certain that such
schemes could reduce price variability for products with a high in-
come elasticity and low price elasticity of demand. In other words,
the size of the stocks that might be accumulated at the end of a
deflationary period if prices were effectively stabilized might be
beyond the limits of either the storage capacity or the financial re-
sources of any international agency. The rise in the price of natural
rubber following March 1950 may illustrate the opposite side of the
problem—the size of stocks that would have been required to limit
the rise in natural rubber prices during the next year or so. In 1949,
natural rubber output was 1,514,000 metric tons; in 1950, output was
1,890,000 tons. In the year June 1949 through May 1950, United States
output of synthetic and reclaimed rubber was 516,000 long tons; the
next year output was 1,005,000 long tons. Ignoring increases in syn-
thetic and reclaimed output elsewhere in the world, the increase in
available supplies of rubber was at least 42 per cent. The price of
Malayan rubber was 17.6 cents a pound in March 1949, 70.9 cents in
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March 1951, and an average of 46.4 cents in the third quarter of
1951. Thus there was approximately a threefold increase in price (at
one time a fourfold increase) even though output increased nearly
50 per cent in a year. If this had been a product with a very low short-
run price elasticity of supply (say, .1 or less), stocks equal to a years'
output of natural rubber might well have been required to have
stabilized prices. And who, one might ask, would have had the fore-
sight to have stored 1.5 million tons of natural rubber by early 1950?
The output of natural rubber had increased fivefold since 1945 and
still gave evidence of increasing further, while synthetic rubber out-
put in the United States was 50 per cent below 1945. Few people
really believed that the price of natural rubber would ever again go
above the United States price for synthetic rubber (about 18 cents in
1949). Consequently, even if there were no problem of storage ca-
pacity or financial resources, it is hard to imagine that any buffer
stock agency would have been able to prevent the rise in the price of
rubber—or of cotton or wool or jute or tin or zinc—that ocurred after
early or mid-1950.
Buffer stocks could have been used to prevent most of the declines
in prices that occurred in 1948 and 1949. But in most cases—an
exception was some foodstuffs with very low income elasticities of
demand—the stocks accumulated in these two years would have
been too small t&have much effect upon the level of prices follow-
ing June 1950. And the post-Korean decline in prices of primary
products came before anyone had even hinted that the United States
was in a dip, recession, or depression. In fact, the stability of pri-
mary product prices since July 1953 has been remarkable. It seems
unlikely that any buffer stock agency would have tried to stem the
downward movement of primary product prices that started in the
second and third quarters of 1951 for several products. Given the
high levels of employment and income that existed throughout the
world, a decline in the prices of many primary products to pre-
Korean levels seemed to many a necessary preface to longer-run
equilibrium between supply and demand. And would not the United
Kingdom and other Western European countries have strongly re-
sisted stabilizing the prices of foodstuffs and raw materials at levels
substantially above those of early 1950?
It should be noted that a part of the stability of primary product
prices since July 1953 has been due to stock operations in the
United States. These operations have been of great importance• in
the wheat, tobacco, and cotton markets and probably in some of
the metal markets. But the stability of price of at least one product—
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wheat—has been purchased at the expense of postponing a re-
source adjustment that appears to be inevitable.
Thus I suggest, on the basis of fairly continuous observation of
storage programs in the United States and in two or three other
countries, that storage programs for individual products could go
some distance in providing a marked degree of price stability under
certain circumstances. They could (1) reduce intra-year variations
when final demand is reasonably stable; (2) prevent, where the
income elasticity of demand is relatively small, significant price
rises in a strong inflationary movement like that after June 1950;
and (3) prevent price declines resulting from declining demand
like that of 1948—1949, and probably also like that of 1937—1938, and
even of 1929—1983. In a major depression large financial resources
would of course be required and provision for additional storage
space would be necessary.
But the degree of price stability achieved would be purchased
at some cost. The cost of storage is the most direct and obvious,
since direct annual storage costs (excluding interest on the value
of the product) frequently amount to 8 to 12 per cent of the value
of the product. Another cost can be the result of mistaken price
expectations on the part of the storage agency, but this cost may
be at least partly if not fully offset by the effects of greater price
stability upon the allocation of resources. If one can generalize from
United States experience, the introduction of greater price stability
may lead to more rapid adoption of new methods of production
and may induce greater emphasis upon profit maximization and
less upon safety considerations in production planning.
Buffering Major United States Imports
It is obvious that the increase in expenditure by governments
or an international agency for reserves during a de-
flation would have a desirable influence upon the -general level of
incomes in the trading world. There would be a multiplier greater
than unity, and the level of imports of areas specializing in and
exporting primary products would be higher than if no such pro-.
gram existed.
But it must be noted that the relative importance in world in-
come of the primary products that are relatively cheap to store is
not very great, surely less than. one-sixth and perhaps not more
than one-tenth. The value of such products actually entering into
international trade in 1950 outside the Soviet bloc, according to
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an estimate in Commodity Trade and Economic Development, was
$18 billion. Thus if a storage agency had added to stocks the equiva-
lent to the total value of world exports of some thirty-six primary
products (excluding only lumber, hides, fertilizers, meat, milk,
cheese, and certain oil seeds) in 1950, this amount would have been
less than 7 per cent of the United States gross national product in
that year.
A serious decline in world economic activity would, obviously re-
quire antirecession measures of a much greater leverage. These would
have to be measures carried out primarily by individual govern-
ments, operating almost wholly within their own national borders.
However, if restrictions on trade were not utilized, the impact of
such national measures would be felt by primary producers through-
out the world. It is true that the expenditure of a dollar upon pri-
mary products for stockpiling would have more effect upon the
incomes of jute producers than would the expenditure of a dollar
paid out in the' United Kingdom as unemployment compensation.
But, in any case, the buffer stock program must be considered as
only one of a number of measures required to stop a world-wide de-
flation, or for that matter, a world-wide inflation.
If I were a producer of a primary product, I am not certain that
I would choose a countercyclical program that placed a great deal
of emphasis upon stockpiling of primary products. If the price of my
product is increased by adding to stocks now, the price will be
decreased when stocks are reduced later. Under certain plausible
circumstances it is possible for such operations to reduce the aggre-
gate income from a product for a business cycle as a whole.
Many persons outside this country fear, not a world-wide de-
pression, but a United States depression serious enough to create
foreign exchange problems for many nations and to interrupt the
flow of investment in underdeveloped areas. Since such a large
share of United States merchandise imports consists of primary
products, a buffer stock program operating on a relatively modest
scale could insulate other parts of the world fairly effectively from
declining United' States demands. For example, the United States
sugar program stabilizes the dollar earnings of Cuba and the Philip-
pines from sugar exports to us, and the recently announced pur-
chase of certain metals acts to stabilize their prices.
As a means of maintaining the demand 'for its exports, the United
States might well consider a rather systematic buffer stock program
for a number of major imports. Such programs should be worked
out in cooperation with the most important exporting groups, and,
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in addition, the interests of competing importers should not be
ignored. This program should be confined to the objective of
counteracting fluctuations in dollar expenditures for primary prod-
ucts resulting from changes in aggregate demand in the United
States.
But a proposal for a United States program of buffer stocks for
durable imports certainly should be secondary to more general
monetary and fiscal measures designed to minimize declines in ag-
gregate demand. In fact, all countercyclical buffer stock schemes can
at best be considered as only one element in a much more inclusive
program to prevent the occurrence and spread of depressions.
COMMENT
WILFIIED MALENBAUM, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Stabilization of prices of internationally traded raw materials
and agricultural products is not a very potent tool for combating
recessions in the United States. This would be true even if we could
assume our entire domestic agricultural price support program to
be subsumed under some major international scheme. On this as-
sumption the international scheme would have about the same
leverage effects upon a downswing as would our present domestic
supports. In Karl Fox's model,' these supports mean that gross
national product falls less than it would without the support pro-
gram—somewhat under 10 per cent less. This estimate takes full
account of the multiplier effects of the expanded agricultural (and
related service) incomes. But it is unrealistic to expect that our
domestic programs would ever be handled through an international
program. A scheme aimed at primary products which we export
might more easily be visualized, but its role as an antirecession
device would be significantly smaller. Expanded incomes from the
tobacco, cotton, rice, wheat, and dried fruit exported would pro-
vide only very small stimulating effects for the United States
economy. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any plan for international
stabilization in these commodities which would add to the effects
generated by our domestic agricultural support programs in which
our export commodities are of course included.
Perhaps an international program would have more important in-
direct effects by stimulating exports from the United States. Thus
1See"The Contribution of Farm Price Support Programs to General Economic
Stability," in this volume.
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if a price stabilization scheme succeeded in expanding incomes in
those countries where exports of primary products loom large in
total incomes, purchases from the United States might be expected
to increase. And the increase need not be confined oniy to the im-
ports of countries directly affected by the stabilization program.
These countries would also be purchasing more from third coun-
tries that might then import more from the United States. Nonethe-
less, the total of such expanded exports could not provide large
stimulants to our economy.
On the whole, therefore, I agree with Johnson that the stabiliza-
tion of international commodity prices is not an important tool for
combating possible United States recessions. But a recession here
may have major consequences for other countries. And some of the
other devices which might well be used to counter recessions could
even aggravate their "exported" effects. A curtailment of our im-
ports can be expected to weigh more heavily upon exporters of
manufactured goods, but directly and indirectly this will also affect
producers of primary products. An international stabilization scheme
might at least mitigate such tendencies to export our depressions.
It cannot be assumed, however, that the maintenance of United
States import demand over the cycle is the basic problem with which
primary exporting countries are concerned. Thus even the record
levels of our national product, and our imports, through 1953 have
been accompanied by growing pressures for international com-
modity price stabilization by important producers of raw materials
entering into world trade. Year-to-year fluctuations in primary
product prices would, of course, be most significant for those econo-
mies in which foreign trade is large relative to the national prod-
uct and where primary goods form an important component of
total international trade. With few exceptions the countries which
meet these criteria are the underdeveloped countries—from Mexico,
with exports at about 10 per cent of its national product and pri-
mary commodities providing about 50 per cent of exports, to Ceylon,
where the foreign sector is almost 40 per cent of the national prod-
uct and three primary goods constitute 90 per cent of exports.
In most underdeveloped areas there is a need for net importation
of capital from abroad. In general they are countries where sav-
ings ratios simply do not permit enough investment of domestic
resources under existing technological conditions to compete with
the rates of population growth. Their own resources need to be
supplemented from abroad if per capita income is to expand. In
these countries, foreign exchange earnings are particularly impor-
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tant to their development programs; they need to purchase foreign
products. Favorable shifts in their terms of trade (if not stabiliza-
tion of export prices as such) can also provide at least a partial
alternative to foreign investment, loans, and grants. Thus an inter-
esting calculation recently made by the Department of State 2 sug-
gests that the countries of South and Southeast Asia earned from
their exports over $2 billion (1949—1950 prices) more in the period
June 1950 through December 1952 simply because of the changed
relationship between import and export prices after 1949—1950.
(The increased earnings are $3.5 billion if account is also taken of
the expanded volume of exports.) The commodities most responsi-
ble for these earnings were rubber, tin, and, rice. There were simi-
lar developments for producers in other areas. The expanded in-
comes of the underdeveloped areas considerably enhanced their
resources available for investment. Such improvements can also
increase the capacity of these countries to borrow from abroad.
Our interest in some form of international commodity stabilization
is thus an essential adjunct of our interest in the development of
friendly nations throughout the world. This emphasis also points
up the complementarity between stabilization schemes and aid.
Economic development may, of course, provide some solution to
the problems of instability. A frequent objective of development
programs 'in underdeveloped areasis the diversification of the
economy (less emphasis upon primary production at least ,for
the export market and more emphasis on self-sufficiency). The
same amount of instability in the prices of internationally traded
commodities will have smaller effects (relatively) as this objective
is achieved. This is obviously a long path to the solution, but it is
probably the basic one.
It is this aspect of international commodity stabilization which
makes the subject of particular importance to us, rather than any
effects it may have upon cyclical fluctuations in the United States.
Of course our policy of development in other lands does have
great significance for long-range growth of the United States
economy. The economic health of that major sector of the world's
people who live in the underdeveloped areas has basic economic
implications for our own future growth. One need not stress here
the political implications for the United States of development in
these areas.
Stabilization of What? In a recent excellent study by a United
Nations group of experts, Commodity Trade and Economic De-
2 "Foreign Trade Developments in South and Southeast Asia, 1950—52," Un-
classified Intelligence Report No. 6349, August 1958.
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velopment, stabilization of prices usually meant the reduction of
short-period fluctuations about a trend. The experts were (or tried
to be) concerned with fluctuations which play an uncertain, or
relatively unimportant, role in efficient resource allocation or in-
come distribution. Such stabilization may be important, and par-
ticularly for countries with less well-organized marketing systems.
Many of the underdeveloped areas fall into this last category. But,
at least in my experience, this type of stabilization is only a partial
concern of most of the countries seeking stabilization. With respect
to prices of primary products alone, they usually seek a new trend,
perhaps one that is fitted to the peaks of past fluctuations. More
frequently, the new trend is one which maintains some parallelism
with the trend in prices of manufactured products. This last im-
plies some form of the parity concept, and is usually based upon
the experience of a past period in which the relationship was not
unfavorable to primary producers. Stabilization which results in
a shift in the terms of trade will of course mean that importers of
raw materials, let us say, will have to pay more for their imports
than they would in the absence of a stabilization program.
Most commodity agreements imply such a transfer as of one
period, with the expectation that there will be a compensating ad-
vantage to the importer at a later time, when prices in the absence
of an agreement will be more favorable to the exporter. Such ar-
rangements would seem to balance benefits over time between
buyers and sellers, at least if the base period for the parity ratio
was not too unrepresentative. My experience with actual commod-
ity agreements is too limited to permit a generalization as to the
degree of balancing-out that is in fact achieved. In the case of
wheat, however, all transfers have to date been in only one direc-
tion. It remains to be seen whether wheat will in fact move under
the present Agreement should world prices fall below the lower
limit of the stipulated price range.
A stabilization scheme satisfactory to the primary producers will
involve, at least initially, some transfer of resources from import-
ing countries. Again there is some parallel with foreign assistance.
Since I believe that foreign assistance is necessary in many of these
countries, I have little objection to this aspect of a price stabiliza-
tion program.
Presumably a country is more interested in stability of income or
of foreign exchange earnings than in stability of prices. Quite
obviously, high prices (however stable)accompanied by low
quantities can be less advantageous under certain supply conditions
than lower prices and much larger quantifies. However logical itINTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICES
may be to concentrate upon a measure which reflects both prices
and quantities, emphasis continues to remain upon stabilization of
prices. This is consistent with the United States experience with
parity incomes and parity prices for agricultural products. It can
be explained in part by the great difficulties of administering
schemes for income stabilization. Usually, however, stabilization of
prices turns out to be more favorable to the producer, particularly
since "stable" prices have tended to contribute to a general ex-
pansion in supply—to larger quantities.
A focus on price stability when the real objective is stability in
returns prompts some concern about elasticity relationships. John-
son's discussion of this subject provides one of the most provocative
sections of his paper. My disagreements with him stem largely
from his use of elasticities, whether of price or income, in the form
in which they are generally computed, i.e. on a national or on a
total commodity basis. Neither of these is very relevant for prob-
lems of earnings from international trade. Here we are usually con-
cerned with only one part of a nation's (or the world's) total
supply of a commodity. The important variable is the volume of
imports, which for many products is a difference between what is
consumed and what is domestically produced (of the same or sub-
stitutable commodities). Indeed, the pertinent variable may be
the volume of imports from a particular source. These residuals
may well vary quite differently from total demand. Thus even
though the demand for wheat is inelastic with respect both to
prices and to income, and therefore the per capita consumption
of wheat in France, say, varies little from year to year, there can
obviously be great variations in France's demand for wheat from
the United States. For a product which is produced and consumed
broadly throughout the world (as is the case for most primary
goods), elasticity computations for total supply and for total de-
mand give little guidance to the price-income relationship for the
exported component of the supply. This is even truer of course
with respect to that component of exports going to, or coming
from, a particular country. If an important United States interest in
stabilization is to maintain the export earnings (or the dollar earn-
ings) of a particular underdeveloped area, we must be concerned
with the problem on an individual country (or group of countries)
basis. Stabilization of prices for a commodity, or even of total
payments for our imports of the commodity, will not assure this
objective, whatever the over-all elasticities.
Techniques for Stabilization. On the usual proposals for price
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stabilization, I have little to add to the views presented in John-
son's paper. I share his general pessimism about the possibilities of
achieving stabilization through export and import quotas and
through buffer stock schemes either for individual or for groups
of commodities. I would agree that, of all these, the buffer stock
procedures for single commodities offer the most hope. Where
they have been practiced in some form (and by countries willing
to pay the price, like the United States), price maintenance and
stability have been achieved. On an international basis there is
still room for more study and more attempts toward workable ar-
rangements. However, the nature of the problem, at least for the
United States today, suggests that the greatest progress will be
achieved with schemes of stabilization which come under the
general heading of compensatory mechanisms.
Stabilization measures might well play a larger part in our pro-
grams of foreign aid to a particular country. There have been pro-
posals for compensatory payments to meet marked changes in a
country's foreign exchange earnings. These have usually involved
more or less automatic recourse to the resources of the International
Monetary Fund or the World Bank. The response to them has
generally been unenthusiastic, and, at least in my opinion, appro-
priately so. Payments should be extended on a selective basis, and as
an integral part of cooperative efforts to accelerate economic growth.
in particular countries. Their form might well be long-period pur-
chase contracts for raw materials, at prices which would probably
be above the market level. While this could be done by groups of
purchasing countries acting together, the United States should be
prepared to take steps in this direction on its own. This may of
course require some form of stock-building programs by the United
States, and some new arrangements relating the public program
to private production, distribution, and use.
Finally, such treatment of the stabilization problem can provide
a means of influencing the usage of foreign exchange earnings in the
underdeveloped country. Favorable terms of trade in the past
have frequently been followed by lower-priority use of the favora-
ble exchange position in which individual countries have found
themselves. Careful planning for the use of these earnings is es-
sential if the stabilization measures are in fact to contribute to
economic growth, the main focus of the United States interest in
the problem.
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